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‘‘Following the Way Which Is Called Heresy’’:
Milton and the Heretical Imperative
Benjamin Myers
John Milton is widely regarded as a forerunner of Lockean liberalism, and
so of the political thought of the English Enlightenment.1 Indeed, already
in 1698, Milton’s biographer John Toland had constructed a unified tradi-
tion of English liberalism running from Milton through Locke, and had
exclaimed that ‘‘nothing can be imagin’d more reasonable, honest, or
pious’’ than Milton’s advocacy of religious toleration.2
This picture of Milton as an ‘‘apostle of toleration’’3 has continued to
shape interpretations of his place in intellectual history. Milton is viewed
alternatively as an advocate of human rights,4 as a proto-Habermasian
thinker who conceptualizes the private sphere in distinction from a secular
public sphere,5 and as a writer who ‘‘anticipates with a resounding magnil-
oquence the principles of western liberalism articulated by John Locke and
1 I am grateful to Ian Hunter for discussions of this material, and to the two anonymous
JHI readers for their valuable criticisms and suggestions. I am also indebted to the partici-
pants in the Contested Histories seminar at the University of Queensland’s Centre for the
History of European Discourses, where an earlier version of this paper was presented.
2 John Toland, The Life of John Milton (London, 1699 [first published 1698]), 146–47.
3 This is how Nicholas von Maltzahn describes Toland’s Milton in his essay, ‘‘The Whig
Milton, 1667–1700,’’ in Milton and Republicanism, ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy
and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 251.
4 Hugh Wilson, ‘‘Milton and the Struggle for Human Rights,’’ in Milton, Rights, and
Liberties, ed. Christophe Tournu and Neil Forsyth (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 21–30.
5 Sharon Achinstein, Milton and the Revolutionary Reader (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1994), 58.
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inscribed in the American constitution.’’6 At the same time, however, schol-
ars continue to note the tensions and paradoxes in Milton’s writing on
liberty and toleration. Thomas Corns, for instance, observes that Milton
presents ‘‘soaring generalizations’’ coupled with ‘‘significant exceptions’’
regarding individuals’ right to toleration,7 while Nigel Smith notes that in-
tolerance seems to be built into the very structure of Milton’s theory of
toleration, so that the whole theory is threatened by ‘‘inconsistency.’’8
But such inconsistencies cannot be ironed out, since, as I hope to show,
they are fundamental to Milton’s whole conception of toleration. Far from
offering a secular, rationalist theory of toleration, Milton develops a radical
theological account of the relation between heresy, faith and toleration.
Throughout his prose works, and culminating in the De Doctrina Christi-
ana, he moves toward a redefinition of heresy as the underlying ‘‘grammar’’
of authentic faith, and as the social glue which holds together a truly free
(because radically Protestant) English society. Here, the right to toleration
is grounded not in human nature as such, nor in adherence to any specific
confessional dogma or institution, but in the subjective practice of radical
religious individualism. In Milton’s account, the universalization of ‘‘her-
esy’’ (defined as individual choice) as the basis of the right to toleration thus
has as its necessary corollary the exclusion of those who refuse to partici-
pate in this social order of autonomous religious choice.
My analysis in this paper of three of Milton’s major prose works, Civil
Power, Areopagitica, and De Doctrina Christiana,9 will seek to clarify both
the apparently secularizing direction in which Milton takes the concept of
heresy, and the radical theological basis of this secularizing move. Milton’s
account, I will argue, is one in which not only the right to toleration, but
also the exception which ultimately defines that right, remains grounded in
a specifically Protestant-theological understanding of the nature of faith.
I. CIVIL POWER: HERESY AND TOLERATION
In February 1659, Milton published a tract against state interference with
religion, entitled A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes: Shewing
6 Thomas N. Corns, ‘‘John Milton, Roger Williams, and the Limits of Toleration,’’ in
Milton and Toleration, ed. Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 74.
7 Corns, 73.
8 Nigel Smith, ‘‘Milton and the European Contexts of Toleration,’’ in Milton and Tolera-
tion, 43.
9 All citations of Milton’s works are from the Yale edition: Complete Prose Works of
John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe et al., 8 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–
82); hereafter cited as CPW.
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That It Is Not Lawful for Any Power on Earth to Compell in Matters of
Religion. This work includes Milton’s best known account of the nature of
heresy—an account that is, in many respects, remarkably close to that of
Locke.
Milton begins Civil Power by defining religion as whatever pertains
‘‘chiefly to the knowledge and service of God.’’ If that is the definition of
religion, then it follows already that religion will always involve differences
of opinion. The ways of God transcend natural knowledge, and so are ‘‘lia-
ble to be variously understood by humane reason.’’10 From the outset, then,
Milton imports the notion of diversity into the very definition of religion.
His point here is not (as it is for Hobbes) that the divine transcendence
relativizes all religious opinions; rather, the fact that transcendent realities
are grasped by human reason means simply that God will be understood in
different ways by different individuals. Thus God’s transcendent inaccessi-
bility to ‘‘the light of nature’’11 constitutes the ground of religious differ-
ences.
Still, it would be a mistake to imagine that Milton is defending reli-
gious diversity in general: his concern in this tract is solely with ‘‘our protes-
tant religion.’’12 Arguing that the authoritative function of scripture is
mediated by individual conscience, he remarks that Protestant Christians
‘‘hav[e] no other divine rule or autoritie from without us . . . but the holy
scripture, and no other within us but the illumination of the Holy Spirit so
interpreting that scripture as warrantable only to our selves.’’13 The exter-
nal authority of scripture is thus accessible only to the internal illumination
of the Spirit, so that no religious authority can transcend the subjectivity of
the believing conscience. Indeed, Milton presses home the subjectivity of
religious commitment, observing that ‘‘no man can know at all times’’ that
he truly possesses the divine illumination and so interprets scripture cor-
rectly.14 As a result, ‘‘no man or body of men in these times can be the
infallible judges or determiners in matters of religion to any other mens
consciences but thir own.’’15
What, then, should the state do about heresy? The word ‘‘heresy,’’ Mil-
ton insists, is merely a ‘‘Greek apparition.’’ People should not be frightened
10 CPW 7: 242. There are clear parallels here between the epistemological bases of Mil-
ton’s and Locke’s views of toleration: see John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Reli-
gion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 350–51.
11 CPW 7: 242.
12 CPW 7: 242.
13 CPW 7: 242.
14 CPW 7: 242.
15 CPW 7: 242–43.
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by this foreign word, but should observe ‘‘that heresie, by what it signifies
in [Greek], is no word of evil note; meaning only the choice or following of
any opinion good or bad.’’16 Indeed, even the New Testament writers speak
of heresy in a neutral way; for instance, in Acts 26:5, Paul says that he was
a Pharisee ‘‘after the exactest heresie of our religion.’’ After citing this verse,
Milton observes with more than a little irony: ‘‘In which sense Presbyterian
or Independent may without reproach be calld a heresie.’’17 Although a
significant neutralizing of the concept of heresy is implicit in this argument,
Milton is not trying here to relativize heresy entirely. At this point, he is still
concerned to speak of heresy pejoratively, as deviant choice. If it is true
that heresy is simply the ‘‘choise . . . of one opinion before another,’’ it is
nevertheless also true that heresy involves a wrong religious choice.18
But what does it mean to form a wrong opinion in religion? Milton
answers this question with characteristic emphasis on the subjective role of
conscience: the wrong or ‘‘heretical’’ opinion is any religious opinion which
rests on external authority instead of on individual conscience:
Seeing therefore that no man, no synod, no session of men . . . can
judge definitively the sense of scripture to another mans conscience
. . . it follows planely, that he who holds in religion that beleef or
those opinions which to his conscience and utmost understanding
appeer . . . in the scripture, though to others he seems erroneous,
can no more be justly censur’d for a heretic then his censurers;
who do but the same thing themselves while they censure him for
so doing.19
Orthodox opinion, in other words, is any opinion which seems right to
the individual (Protestant) conscience, so that no individual believer can be
censured by another. The flipside of this, of course, is that heresy exists
wherever the individual Protestant fails to follow the light of conscience.
16 CPW 7: 247. This etymological point was commonly recognized, even among conform-
ist authors. For example, in his anonymously published work on the evil of heresy, The
necessity of heresies asserted and explained in a sermon ad clerum (London, 1688), Sam-
uel Hill acknowledges that the Christian use of the term differs from the word’s original
use: ‘‘Heresie then, literally and generally importing Division, in Philosophy, among the
Greeks, signifies the separation of Men into different Schools and Parties, upon the ac-
count of different Doctrines and Opinions, without any form of Excommunication, Exe-
cration, or Extermination from common and friendly Society’’ (3).
17 CPW 7: 247.
18 CPW 7: 247.
19 CPW 7: 247–48.
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‘‘He then who to his best apprehension follows the scripture, though
against any point of doctrine by the whole church receivd, is not the here-
tic’’; rather, the heretic is the one ‘‘who follows the church against his con-
science and perswasion grounded on the scripture.’’20 In this way, Milton
inverts the traditional heresy/orthodoxy nexus: those who seem to be or-
thodox may be the most heretical of all, while those who appear to be
heretics may be the most orthodox.
In this account, what matters is not the content of religious belief so
much as the concrete practice of believing. Orthodoxy and heresy are iden-
tifiable not by their doctrinal or confessional content but by their underly-
ing epistemologies. Orthodoxy is belief that has been formed in the right
way; it is a religious practice in which belief is generated from the individual
Protestant conscience in response to scripture. Another person’s belief, on
the other hand, may be materially identical with its orthodox counterpart,
but it is nevertheless heretical if it has been formed in the wrong way,
through reliance on external authority. Heresy, one might say, lies not in
the what of faith, but in the how.
The immediate implication of this inversion of heresy should be plain
enough: it is not Protestant sectarianism but Catholicism that constitutes
the archetypal heresy. Schismatics with eccentric religious opinions may in
fact be ‘‘the best protestants’’; there is no limit to the range of possible
opinions, since among Protestants there can be only ‘‘a free and lawful
debate at all times . . . of what opinion soever.’’21 But Catholics, in contrast,
ground their belief on the testimony of the church, thus relinquishing the
rule of conscience and so yielding to the practice of heresy. For this reason,
Milton singles out Catholics as the only true heretics—indeed, the Catholic
Church itself is precisely ‘‘a catholic heresie against scripture’’22:
no man in religion is properly a heretic at this day, but he who
maintains traditions or opinions not probable by scripture; who,
for aught I know, is the papist only; he the only heretic, who
counts all heretics but himself.23
Nevertheless, Milton insists that the management of heresy is a function of
the church rather than the state. Heretics should be punished not by state
20 CPW 7: 248.
21 CPW 7: 249.
22 CPW 7: 254.
23 CPW 7: 249.
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coercion, but by ecclesial excommunication.24 While still assuming that her-
etics should be punished, then, Milton’s proposal effectively reduces the
management of heresy to zero: the only heretics are Catholics, and the only
punishment due them is excommunication from the (Protestant) church.
Thus in a single argument, Milton attempts both to invert the traditional
understanding of heresy, and to remove heresy entirely from the jurisdiction
of the state.
Notoriously, though, Milton goes on to suggest that the state should
not tolerate Catholic believers. Like Locke, he offers a non-religious justifi-
cation for this policy of persecution. Catholics should be persecuted not
because they are heretics, but because they are ‘‘supported mainly by a civil,
and, except in Rome, by a forein power: justly therefore to be suspected,
not tolerated by the magistrate of another countrey.’’ Their persecution is,
in other words, ‘‘for just reason of state more then of religion.’’25 In short,
having granted civil liberty to Catholics with the right hand, Milton with-
draws it again with the left. His argument here is structurally very close to
Locke’s judgment that Turks ‘‘have no right to be tolerated’’ since they
‘‘deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince.’’26
And while both Milton and Locke justify the possibility of persecution on
ostensibly non-religious grounds, their respective arguments are clearly
driven by specific theological commitments about the nature of faith and
the relation between subjective piety and external authority—a crucial
problem to which I will return later.
While Civil Power offers a subjectivized and distinctly Protestant ac-
count of heresy, Milton is still moving here within the general discourse of
heresy as religious error, or (in the definition of John Owen) as ‘‘the choice
or embracement of any new destructive Opinion.’’27 As well as remaining
close to this understanding of heresy as error, Milton’s position in Civil
Power is strikingly close to the later Lockean theory: the sphere of religious
belief is sharply differentiated from the sphere of civil power, and individual
liberty gives rise to the subjective right to toleration, irrespective of whether
the individual’s religious opinions are right or wrong.
Although this account of heresy is very familiar—and may justly be
described as proto-Lockean—I now want to argue that, elsewhere in Mil-
24 CPW 7: 249–50.
25 CPW 7: 254.
26 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration [1689], ed. John Horton and Susan Men-
dus (London: Routledge, 1991), 46.
27 John Owen, A vindication of the animadversions on fiat lux (London, 1664), 63.
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ton’s corpus, there is a move toward a quite different conception of heresy.
To explore this alternative version of heresy, I will turn to two of Milton’s
other prose writings, one earlier than Civil Power, and the other later.
II. AREOPAGITICA: THE VIRTUE OF SCHISM
In November 1644, Milton published his famous defense of unlicensed
printing, the Areopagitica. Against those who were anxious to prevent the
publication of heterodox theological books, Milton offers a vigorous apo-
logia for the value of public debate and theological diversity. Just as the
human body needs exercise for health, so too, he insists, ‘‘our faith and
knowledge thrives by exercise.’’28 Truth can be attained only by hard strug-
gle, and the publication of diverse and even heterodox books plays a crucial
role in energizing this struggle. Thus Milton offers the judgment: ‘‘I cannot
praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that never
sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race.’’29 Against such
a ‘‘cloister’d vertue,’’ Milton himself believes that the temptation of heresy
will ultimately fortify and refine Christian faith.
Further, Milton sounds a distinctive Protestant note against the mere
conservation of tradition: ‘‘Truth is compar’d in Scripture to a streaming
fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetuall progression, they sick’n into
a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.’’30 Authentic Protestant faith
thus entails constant movement which is the exact opposite of unthinking
conformity. Indeed, Milton appeals to his readers’ Protestant sensibilities
by observing that a Protestant who receives his beliefs from the authority
of any religious institution will simply ‘‘live and dye in as arrant an implicit
faith, as any lay Papist.’’31 To adopt such an attitude of implicit faith—that
is, to accept beliefs without having won them personally through hard
struggle—is nothing less than a betrayal of the reformation. Indeed, the
only way to be true heirs of the reformation is to continue the process of
religious and social reform right here and now in England; otherwise, we
prove that ‘‘we have lookt so long upon the blaze that Zuinglius and Calvin
hath beacon’d up to us, that we are stark blind.’’32 As in Civil Power, Mil-
ton thus argues here that truth is far too important to be left to the judg-
28 CPW 2: 543.
29 CPW 2: 515.
30 CPW 2: 543.
31 CPW 2: 543.
32 CPW 2: 550.
381
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ JULY 2008
ment of any religious authority. To believe something just because ‘‘[the]
Pastor sayes so, or the Assembly so determins,’’ is to be ‘‘a heretick in the
truth’’—in such a case, ‘‘though [a person’s] belief be true, yet the very
truth he holds, becomes his heresie.’’33
Although the Areopagitica offers this provocative comment on heresy,
it has much more to say about the closely related theme of schism. With the
bewildering proliferation of Protestant sects in the 1640s, one of the princi-
pal arguments for the licensing of the press was the threat of schism. Milton
thus trains his sights on this argument, and he seeks to undermine as
sharply as possible ‘‘these fantastic terrors of sect and schism.’’34 Scoffing
at the anxiety of the bishops, he says:
There be who perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and
make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their
maxims. . . . They are the troublers, they are the dividers of unity,
who neglect and permit not others to unite those dissever’d peeces
which are yet wanting to the body of Truth. To be still searching
what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to
truth as we find it . . . this is the golden rule in Theology as well as
in Arithmetick, and makes up the best harmony in a Church; not
the forc’t and outward union of cold, and neutrall, and inwardly
divided minds.35
The logic of this argument is similar to the logic of Milton’s characteriza-
tion of heresy in the same work: just as the religious conformists are the
real heretics, so too the bishops who insist on institutional unity are the real
‘‘dividers of unity.’’ They are promoting an outward and coerced unity to
conceal the reality of ‘‘cold, and neutrall, and inwardly divided minds.’’
The problem, then, is that the progressive advance toward truth is halted
by such ‘‘forc’t and outward union.’’ In contrast, Milton believes that free
and energetic debate will produce an authentic, inward unity, even though,
externally, ‘‘there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many
opinions.’’36
Milton takes his argument a step further when he claims that Christian
unity subsists precisely in this clamour of diverse opinions. Earlier the same
year, Thomas Hill had preached a sermon on religious conformity, and had
33 CPW 2: 543.
34 CPW 2: 554.
35 CPW 2: 550–51.
36 CPW 2: 554.
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used the building of Solomon’s Temple as a symbolic example of the evil of
schism. Citing the early Protestant theologian Peter Martyr Vermigli, Hill
writes:
It is an observation of a Learned Divine, from that passage [1
Kings 6:7] while the Temple was in building, there was neither
hammer, nor axe, nor any toole of iron heard in the house; that
thence wee should learn, in Church affaires, in matters of Religion,
to manage all with sweet peace and unanimity; That no noise of
contentions and schismes (saith hee) might be heard, O that God
would grant this mercy, that in his house wee might all thinke and
speake the same thing.37
As Ernest Sirluck has noted,38 Milton subverts this argument by attending
to the larger context of the Old Testament narrative of the Temple’s con-
struction:
as if, while the Temple of the Lord was building, some cutting,
some squaring the marble, others hewing the cedars, there should
be a sort of irrationall men who could not consider there must be
many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and the
timber, ere the house of God can be built.39
Further, Milton argues, even the finished building remains an artefact of
irreducible difference and diversity: ‘‘when every stone is laid artfully to-
gether, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this
world; neither can every peece of the building be of one form.’’40 Indeed,
while Thomas Hill had insisted that unity means ‘‘think[ing] and speak[ing]
the same thing,’’ Milton declaims: ‘‘nay rather the perfection [of the build-
ing] consists in this, that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly dissi-
militudes . . . arises the goodly and the gracefull symmetry that commends
the whole pile and structure.’’41 And changing the metaphor, he remarks
that, in spite of all the differences within English Protestantism, there is a
‘‘firm root, out of which we all grow, though into branches.’’42
37 Thomas Hill, The Good Old Way, Gods Way, to Soule-Refreshing Rest (London,
1644), 39.
38 CPW 2: 555 n. 244.
39 CPW 2: 555.
40 CPW 2: 555.
41 CPW 2: 555.
42 CPW 2: 556.
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According to this argument, then, unity is not to be achieved in spite
of differences and schisms, but precisely through the richly differentiated
life of a free-thinking religious society. England’s ‘‘perfection’’ consists not
in blandly ‘‘think[ing] and speak[ing] the same thing,’’ but in the ‘‘goodly
and gracefull symmetry’’ that emerges from the co-existence of diverse sects
and schisms. Such differing parties are not ‘‘continuous,’’ but ‘‘contigu-
ous’’: they are irreducibly different, existing side by side as the multiple
components of a coherent social order. Milton’s defence of schism is thus
aimed at nothing less than a reinvention of the nature of the church itself—
and, subsequently, at a theological reinvention of the nature of English soci-
ety. The progressive movement toward truth is not a movement toward
ever-increasing sameness, but toward sharply accentuated differences of re-
ligious choice and opinion. Divergences and schisms should not be expected
finally to converge into a smooth unity, but instead to come together pre-
cisely in their differences, like the complex parts of a single building.
The argument here—published fifteen years before the tract on Civil
Power—moves within a framework very different from that of the later
work. While in Civil Power Milton takes it for granted that schism should
be tolerated as a necessary evil, here in the Areopagitica he advances an
argument not merely for the toleration of schism, but for the virtue of
schism. In this work, the church is envisaged as a community of schism—a
community structured and defined by religious differences. The noise of
religious argument and debate is thus portrayed as the sound of harmony
rather than of discord; the unity of the church subsists in difference.
In the Areopagitica, Milton does not yet seek to defend heresy as such.
He thinks of it here, as in Civil Power, as religious deviance (albeit one that
should be tolerated). But in his depiction of the church as a community
defined by schism, he anticipates a later argument, in which the concept of
heresy would itself be reinvented. In one of his late prose works, Milton
would come to define the Christian community as a community of heresy,
just as he has here defined it as a community of schism.
III. DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA:
THE BELIEVER AS HERETIC
Milton’s radical system of theology, the De Doctrina Christiana, was dis-
covered in 1823 as a ‘‘complicated mess of manuscript’’43 among Milton’s
43 Roy Flannagan, John Milton: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 74.
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state papers. The exact date of composition is impossible to determine, and
the manuscript itself evinces an ongoing process of correction and revision,
so that it is best regarded as an unfinished work.44 In any case, it is likely
that Milton’s work on the theological system had largely ceased by 1665,
around the same time that he finished work on Paradise Lost.45 So the trea-
tise’s opening epistle, which concerns us here, must have been written no
more than five or six years after the tract on Civil Power.
While parts of this Latin systematic theology are rough and frag-
mented, the opening epistle is a highly polished work. Characteristically,
Milton takes the opportunity to present a carefully constructed authorial
persona: he assures the reader that in this treatise, as in all his earlier prose,
he is writing as an uncompromising champion of individual libertas. The
epistle begins with the individualistic assertion that ‘‘God has revealed the
way of eternal salvation only to the individual faith of each person,’’ so
that ‘‘anyone who wants to be saved should work out his beliefs for him-
self.’’ For this reason, Milton says, ‘‘I made up my mind to puzzle out a
religious creed for myself by my own exertions,’’ based solely on the au-
thority of scripture. This personal theological exercise was necessary, since
Milton found himself dissatisfied with all existing systems of theology; in
his opinion, ‘‘all previous writers have failed in this attempt.’’46 By his own
exertion and by ‘‘long hours of study’’ over several years, he has thus devel-
oped his own system of theology.47 Indeed, he has worked so hard and so
long on this system that it has become his ‘‘dearest and best possession’’—a
possession that he now wants to share with the public out of sheer good-
will.48
Immediately, however, Milton anticipates the reaction against some of
his unorthodox ideas. After all, the ensuing chapters of the treatise defend
such opinions as Arianism, antinomianism, anti-sabbatarianism, thnetop-
44 See Gordon Campbell, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale and Fiona J. Tweedie, Milton
and the Manuscript of De Doctrina Christiana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
66–68, 156–57.
45 Here I am following Barbara K. Lewalski’s dating in The Life of John Milton: A Critical
Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 415–16. On the complexities of dating the treatise,
see Campbell et al., Manuscript, 39–68; and Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument: A
Study of Milton’s De Doctrina Christiana as a Gloss upon Paradise Lost (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1941), 8–24.
46 CPW 6: 117–18. My citations of this work are occasionally modified against the Latin
text in The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank A. Patterson et al., 18 vols. in 21 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1931–38).
47 CPW 6: 120.
48 CPW 6: 121.
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sychism (or ‘‘soul sleep’’), creation ex materia (as opposed to ex nihilo),
polygamy, divorce, and the synergy of grace and works in salvation. In view
of all this, Milton asks his readers to ‘‘avoid prejudice and malice,’’ even
though ‘‘many of the views I have published are at odds with certain con-
ventional opinions.’’49 Just as in the Areopagitica he had argued that open
public debate leads toward truth, so he insists here that his unconventional
opinions cannot ‘‘throw the church into confusion’’; on the contrary, open
and critical discussion will lead only to ever-increasing clarity. Moreover,
he appeals to the Protestant conviction that ordinary believers as well as
specialists should have access to the truth: ‘‘free discussion and inquiry . . .
are allowed in the academic schools, and should certainly be denied to no
believer.’’50 As usual, then, Milton is confident in the self-attesting power
of the truth: ‘‘For we are ordered to find out the truth about all things, and
the daily increase of the light of truth fills the church much rather with
brightness and strength than with confusion.’’51 Echoing the Areopagitica,
Milton thus affirms the liberty of individual believers to assert and to dis-
cuss their own opinions. And as in Civil Power, he protests against the use
of coercion in religion:
Without this freedom, there is no religion and no gospel; violence
alone prevails [sine qua libertate, religio nulla, Evangelium nullum
est; sola vis viget]; and it is disgraceful and disgusting that the
Christian religion should be supported by violence. Without this
freedom, we are still enslaved: not, as once, by the law of God but,
what is vilest of all, by human law, or rather, to be more exact, by
an inhuman tyranny.52
While such arguments repeat themes that are familiar from Milton’s
earlier prose, when he comes to the question of heresy, Milton sets off in a
surprising new direction. To start with, his etymological comment on the
term ‘‘heresy’’ is familiar enough: as in earlier works, he observes that
the ‘‘invidious title’’ and ‘‘hateful name’’ of ‘‘heretic’’ is discontinuous with
the way the term hairesis functions in the New Testament. It is therefore
49 CPW 6: 121.
50 CPW 6: 121. In contrast, many Protestant writers specifically attributed the rise of
heresy to the theological ignorance of the uneducated classes. For instance, in The neces-
sity of heresies, Samuel Hill condemns the ‘‘common People’’ who are led into heresy
when ‘‘their ears itch after strange and empty Novelties’’ (26).
51 CPW 6: 121.
52 CPW 6: 123.
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a ‘‘perversion of justice’’ when self-styled orthodox believers condemn as
heretical ‘‘anything they consider inconsistent with conventional beliefs.’’53
In passing, Milton still concedes a pejorative sense of the term ‘‘heresy’’:
‘‘nothing can correctly be called heresy unless it contradicts [the New Testa-
ment].’’54 But then, immediately, he presses the term ‘‘heresy’’ in a very
different direction:
For my own part, I follow Holy Scripture alone. I follow no other
heresy or sect. . . . If this is heresy, I confess with Paul in Acts
24:14: ‘following the way which is called heresy, I worship the
God of my fathers, believing all things that are written in the law
and the prophets’; and, I add, whatever is written in the New Tes-
tament as well. Any other arbiters or supreme interpreters of
Christian faith, together with all so-called implicit faith, I, in com-
mon with the whole Protestant church, refuse to acknowledge.55
In this remarkable passage, Milton offers a construction of heresy that dif-
fers fundamentally from all his earlier discussions of this theme. Here, as
an introduction to his own heterodox system of theology, he seeks to re-
frame the discourse of heresy in a way that evacuates the term ‘‘heresy’’
entirely of its pejorative sense. In Civil Power, he had accepted that heresy
was religious error; but here, in the De Doctrina, he takes the term ‘‘heresy’’
and deploys it to describe the very essence of Protestant piety itself. The
pejorative connotations recede from view as the word is restored to its
primitive etymology. The heretic is simply the one who chooses; and since
the essence of Protestantism is individual choice, the true Protestant is the
quintessential heretic.
At a single stroke, then, Milton attempts to shift the discourse of heresy
in a wholly new direction, by identifying heresy with the act of individual
faith. As Janel Mueller observes, Milton’s earlier depiction of ‘‘a heretick
in the truth’’ —someone who believes the right things in the wrong way—is
‘‘paradoxically transformed from negative to positive by now overtly
stressing the pre-Christian personal sense of ‘heresy’ as an individual’s free,
reasoned choice.’’ The epistle to the De Doctrina thus presents ‘‘a reso-
nantly paradoxical self-portrait of the true Christian as heretic.’’56 Now,
53 CPW 6: 123.
54 CPW 6: 123.
55 CPW 6: 123–24.
56 Janel Mueller, ‘‘Milton on Heresy,’’ in Milton and Heresy, ed. Stephen B. Dobranski
and John Rumrich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 32–33.
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therefore, it is precisely the character of the authentic Protestant to be ‘‘a
heretick in the truth’’—to generate all religious belief from the autonomous
deliberations of illuminated reason, under the guidance of the scriptures
alone. Milton is thus a heretic just as the apostle Paul was: his heresy is the
choice to worship God on the basis of God’s self-revelation in scripture.
Indeed, scripture is Milton’s heresy, since his choice is determined solely by
this authority; thus he insists, ‘‘I follow Holy Scripture alone; I follow no
other heresy or sect [haeresin aliam, sectam aliam sequor nullam].’’ Here,
where obedience to scripture is characterized simply as one possible heresy
among others, all the weight is placed on the etymology of hairesis as
‘‘choice,’’ so that the usual religious sense of heresy as deviant choice simply
falls away.
Moreover, this transformation of the concept of heresy takes a further
step when Milton invokes the ‘‘whole Protestant church’’ (universa Protes-
tantium ecclesia) as the proper site of heretical belief. It is a commonplace
of sociological studies of heresy that ‘‘pressures from outside and inside a
group produce anxiety about criteria of belonging,’’57 so that heresy serves
the social function of marking the group’s boundary: the heretic, by defini-
tion, is the one who falls outside the negotiated boundary, and the resulting
exclusion or persecution of the heretic ‘‘springs from the instinct for the
necessity of group unity.’’58 This sociological commonplace is, however,
inverted in Milton’s construal of Protestantism. Milton is a ‘‘heretic’’ pre-
cisely because he is a member of the ‘‘whole Protestant church.’’ It is his
inclusion in this particular social group that eliminates the possibility of
religious conformity and establishes the imperative of personal ‘‘heresy.’’
Precisely because he is a Protestant, Milton cannot acknowledge the legiti-
macy of any faith except that which is arrived at independently, nor can he
accept any external arbiters or interpreters of faith. To do so would neces-
sarily exclude him from the company of authentic Protestants (and of the
apostle Paul, whom he portrays here as the archetypal Protestant, and so
too as the archetypal heretic).
Heresy is, one might say, the underlying grammar of Protestant dis-
course; it is the unifying ethos of the Protestant community. Just as Milton
depicts Catholic faith as ‘‘implicit’’ faith59—as belief divorced from choice
57 Rowan Williams, ‘‘Defining Heresy,’’ in The Origins of Christendom in the West, ed.
Alan Kreider (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 322.
58 Georg Simmel, Essays on Religion, ed. and trans. H. J. Helle and L. Nieder (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 114–15.
59 CPW 6: 124.
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—so he depicts Protestant faith as the unceasing movement of individual
choice, and thus (in the proper sense) as heresy. In this construal, the con-
cept of heresy is still being used to define the boundaries of Christian com-
munity. But here, the heretic is not the one outside the community, but the
one inside. Simply put, the heretic is the true believer; heresy is nothing
more or less than faith itself.
IV. THE HERETICAL IMPERATIVE
Whereas in Civil Power Milton presupposes an understanding of heresy as
religious error, in Areopagitica and De Doctrina he begins to move lan-
guage of ‘‘schism’’ and ‘‘heresy’’ in quite a different direction. First, in the
Areopagitica, the concept of schism is imported into the definition of the
church, so that both schism itself and the need for any state management
of schism are sharply relativized. The logic of this reinvention of schism is
later deployed in the De Doctrina, where the term ‘‘heresy’’ is pressed back
to its classical, pre-pejorative sense of ‘‘choice.’’ The results of this move
are striking. Thinkers like Locke (in England) and Christian Thomasius (in
Germany) would later relativize heresy by observing that there is no objec-
tive standpoint from which one group can determine the orthodoxy or het-
erodoxy of another: as Thomasius writes, ‘‘each religion will be orthodox
to itself, but heretical to . . . the others’’60; and in Locke’s words, ‘‘every
church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical.’’61 Milton’s
argument in the De Doctrina, however, is not aimed at this kind of relativi-
zation. Instead, Milton relativizes heresy precisely by universalizing it. Since
the essential characteristic of religious belief is choice, it follows that all
religion is heretical.
What I think Milton is aiming at here is a thoroughgoing reinvention
of heresy: a construction of ‘‘heresy’’ as a wholly positive concept, and
indeed as a moral imperative. Faith is heresy; heresy (understood as choice)
constitutes one’s inclusion in the Christian community, and so also one’s
right to toleration by the state. In part, Milton achieves this reinvention of
heresy by appealing to a highly formalized conception of religious faith.
The specific content of faith is less important than the act itself of deliberat-
60 Christian Thomasius, ‘‘On the Right of Protestant Princes regarding Heretics’’ [1697],
translated as an appendix in Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State:
The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 181.
61 Locke, 24.
389
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ JULY 2008
ing and choosing between alternative religious possibilities. In this view,
therefore, one belongs to the Christian community not by virtue of any
specific doctrinal or confessional commitments, but through a set of prac-
tices, through an epistemology of religious self-determination in which all
external authorities are rigorously questioned and critiqued.
Once this vision of the church as a community of heresy has been
glimpsed, Milton expects that the need for any specific policy of toleration
will simply dissolve. There is a somewhat utopian coloring to all this, in
as much as Milton is untroubled by the possibility that rival Protestant
communities might simply erupt into violence and chaos. But this utopian
coloring is precisely the point: Milton is not trying here to recommend a
policy for the prevention of violence and conflict; he is trying to reconstruct
the language and self-understanding of Protestantism itself in such a way
that religious violence and state persecution alike will simply be ruled out in
advance. The Protestant society which Milton envisions is a society whose
underlying grammar—its social glue, so to speak—is heresy. In such a soci-
ety, the universalization of heresy should constitute a de facto relativization
of any single group’s claim to orthodoxy vis-a`-vis competing theories.
I say that Milton’s account should relativize heresy—but it is important
to ask whether Milton in fact achieves the degree of religious relativization
that he is pursuing. If the underlying basis of a free society is the practice of
individual religious choice, what then becomes of those who refuse to en-
gage in this practice? What becomes of Roman Catholics, who simply re-
fuse to become heretics in Milton’s (positive) sense—that is, they refuse to
make the individual conscience the locus of religious authority? In Milton’s
conception of English society, such persons are clearly excluded: their re-
fusal of individualistic choice is tantamount to a repudiation of the entire
social order, so that the possibility of their toleration by the state cannot
even be entertained. In other words, Milton’s relativization of heresy, if
carried out as a social program, would lead to precisely the same impasse
as Locke’s theory of toleration: the practice of subjective Protestant piety
gives rise to the right to toleration, but the resulting construction necessarily
excludes those who do not practice such piety, or who practice the wrong
kind.62 For all its uniqueness, then, Milton’s reinvention of heresy finally
leads to the same place as the Lockean theory. Although Milton’s concep-
62 See Ian Hunter’s analysis of the Lockean theory of toleration in The Secularisation of
the Confessional State, 162–67, and in his unpublished conference paper, ‘‘The Tolera-
tionist Programs of Thomasius and Locke,’’ Natural Law and Toleration Conference,
British Academy, London, April 13 2007.
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tion of society is much more radical and fissiparous than Locke’s, Milton
still supplies the political architecture for his own radicalized ideal of a
Protestant confessional state.
And although Roman Catholics constitute the exemplary case of a
group excluded from the right to toleration, one cannot help wondering
also about the place of ordinary Protestants within Milton’s schema. A pre-
scription of faith’s radical individualism in distinction from authorities and
institutions is all very well for an intellectual like Milton himself, but it is
unlikely that the ordinary English Protestant would be able to measure up
to these rigorous standards of individualism. One wonders whether it
would have been possible for most seventeenth-century believers to engage
in the kind of carefully measured deliberations and institutional critique
that Milton prescribes—and, therefore, whether such persons would also
fall outside the boundaries of the benevolent system of liberty and tolera-
tion. In short, Milton’s vision of the Protestant church as a community of
choice begins to look suspiciously like the vision of a Protestant intellectual
elite, comprising those who—‘‘elect above the rest’’63—have the necessary
training and leisure to construct their own individual systems of belief, and
who subsequently possess the subjective right to be tolerated.
In raising these questions, I am not suggesting that Milton’s conception
of toleration is merely ‘‘inconsistent,’’ or that his otherwise rational theory
of toleration is hampered by an unfortunate remainder of religious preju-
dice. On the contrary, Milton’s theory of toleration is theological through
and through. The right to toleration is grounded on a specific Protestant
understanding of the nature of faith; and the exception to this right is inex-
tricably connected to the whole logic of toleration. Indeed, the normative
‘‘centre’’ of Milton’s theory is constituted precisely by its exception, by its
exclusion of certain groups who are declared incapable of moral participa-
tion in the sphere of politics, and who thus forfeit the right to toleration.
But leaving aside such critical considerations, a final question presents
itself: is there not something strangely prescient—something strikingly
modern—in Milton’s conception of heresy? In the De Doctrina, Milton
envisages a society in which all persons ground their own beliefs on individ-
ual choice alone; a society in which choice is severed from the authoritative
function of religious institutions; a society whose fundamental organizing
grammar, therefore, is ‘‘heresy.’’ Might it be possible that this idealized
63 See the acute analysis in Stephen M. Fallon, ‘‘ ‘Elect above the rest’: Theology as Self-
Representation in Milton,’’ in Milton and Heresy, 93–116.
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heretical society is in fact a distinctive Protestant anticipation of later social
realities?
In his famous 1979 work on The Heretical Imperative, the sociologist
of religion Peter Berger characterized modernity as the social universaliza-
tion of heresy. Admittedly Berger’s schematic depiction of a transition from
‘‘premodernity’’ to a unified epoch of ‘‘modernity’’ cannot be taken too
seriously; but his argument nevertheless casts a suggestive light on the rein-
vention of heresy that we have been considering here. Berger argues that
the proliferation of choice and the inescapable necessity of choosing form
the very ‘‘fabric’’ of modernity.64 Whereas in premodern societies, heresy
was a deviation from more general situations of religious certainty, in
modernity, heresy has become an ‘‘imperative’’: it is no longer merely a
possibility, but a social necessity.65 According to Berger, the ‘‘heretical im-
perative’’ is therefore ‘‘a root phenomenon of modernity.’’ While heresy
had once been ‘‘the occupation of marginal and eccentric types,’’ it has now
become one of the basic conditions of life: ‘‘heresy has become universal-
ized.’’66 Summarizing Berger’s interpretation, Jacques Berlinerblau thus ob-
serves that ‘‘modernity itself is predicated on the heretical ethos,’’ since
‘‘modernity makes choice the currency of all social existence.’’67
Is this not precisely the kind of situation that Milton envisages when
he universalizes heresy and makes it constitutive of all religious belief? If
so, one could conclude that Milton’s conception of heresy in fact points
toward modern social realities in a way that is even more striking and more
remarkable than the influential Lockean theory of toleration. If Milton
wanted England to become a society whose currency was individual choice,
then we might say he got what he wanted. Indeed, we might conclude that
the emergence of a certain kind of ‘‘modernity’’ is precisely the social imple-
mentation of this theological drive toward choice (hairesis). It is the elimi-
nation of the possibility of heresy (qua error) through the universalization
of heresy (qua choice). It is, therefore, the overcoming of heresy by the
‘‘heretical imperative.’’
The strikingly ‘‘modern’’ dimension of Milton’s thought, then, is not
any movement toward a non-religious secularization of politics. It is rather
a profound theologizing impulse—the impulse to re-imagine and reinvent
64 Peter L. Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Af-
firmation (New York: Anchor, 1979), 2.
65 Berger, 28.
66 Berger, 30–31.
67 Jacques Berlinerblau, ‘‘Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa,’’ History
of Religions 40 (2001): 333.
392
Myers ✦ Milton and the Heretical Imperative
entire social orders theologically. And so, while many historical narratives
portray the Enlightenment as a fundamental break with religion, in Mil-
ton’s work the turn toward modernity appears not as a turn from religion
to the secular, but precisely as the radical (and radically Protestant) reinven-
tion of religion itself.
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